

I. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1 4, 1359b12-16; cf. I 2, 1358a22-6, I 1, 1355b3, I 2, 1356a33,

But the more we try to make either rhetoric or dialectic not, what they really are, faculties, but sciences, the more we shall be inadvertently destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with *logoi*.

ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.

II. Aristotle *Rhet.* I 1, 1355a14-18, 1355a 21-b5.

0. For it belongs to the same faculty (δύναμις) to see the true and what is like the truth (τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ), and at the same time human beings are sufficiently well orientated towards the true by nature and mostly hit truth. For which reason being good at aiming for reputable opinions belongs to the person who is also disposed in the same way toward the truth (1355a14-18)...
1. Rhetoric is useful (χρήσιμος) because the things that are true and the things that are just are naturally stronger than their opposites, so that if the judgments are other than they should be, defeat is one's own fault, which is a cause for reproach.
2. What is more, with regard to some auditors, not even if we had the most exact knowledge, would it be easy for us to persuade them by speaking on the basis of it. For the account in accordance with truth is instruction (διδασκαλία), and this is impossible, but it is necessary rather to make our proofs and arguments on the basis of common items, just as we also said in the *Topics* about encounters with the many (cf. *Top.* I 2, 101a30).
3. Furthermore it is necessary to be able to persuade auditors of opposites, just as in syllogisms, not so that we should do both (for it is not necessary to persuade people of base things), but so that how things are should not escape us, and so that when someone else makes unjust use of arguments we should be able to dissolve them. None of the other arts, then, argue for opposites, but dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, for they are in the same way of opposites.

4. Yet the underlying matters are not like this, but the things that are true and the things that are better are by nature always more readily argued and more persuasive, to speak without qualification.
5. And furthermore it would be strange if it were a disgrace not to be able to defend oneself bodily, but being unable to do so in speech or argument (λόγος), which is more proper to human beings than the use of the body, were not. And if someone making unjust use of such a faculty of arguments (δύναμις τῶν λόγων) would be responsible for especially great harms, this belongs in common to all the goods apart from virtue, above all the most useful....

0. τό τε γὰρ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές πεφύκασιν ἰκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀληθειάν ἐστιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι...

1. χρήσιμος δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τὰληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἱ κρίσεις γίνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττάσθαι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως,

2. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾶδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πείσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιείσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως.

3. ἔτι δὲ τὰναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφοτέρω πρᾶττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τὰναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰσὶν ἀμφοτέρω τῶν ἐναντίων.

4. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὰληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

5. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχροὺς μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχροὺς· ὁ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάβειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων...

III. Aristotle, *Top.* VIII 14, 163b9-16.

'With regard to knowledge and philosophical wisdom, to be able to see together and to have seen together the consequences that follow from each hypothesis is no small

instrument (, for it only remains to choose one of them correctly, and for this a good nature is needed, i.e., the good nature that relates to the truth, to be able to choose truth and flee falsehood well, precisely what those who are well endowed by nature do, for loving and hating well what is presented to them, they judge what is best.

πρὸς τε γνῶσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν φρόνησιν τὸ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν καὶ συνεωρακέναι τὰ ἀφ' ἑκατέρας συμβαίοντα τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὐ μικρὸν ὄργανον· λοιπὸν γὰρ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἐλέσθαι θάτερον. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν εὐφυᾶ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐλέσθαι τὰληθῆς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος· ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὖ δύνανται ποιεῖν· εὖ γὰρ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες τὸ προσφερόμενον εὖ κρίνουσι τὸ βέλτιστον.